Valparaiso University Law Review
Volume 12
Number 3 Spring 1978

pp.617-621

Spring 1978

Raoul Berger, Government by the Judiciary: The Transformation of
the Fourteenth Amendment
Thomas H. Nelson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas H. Nelson, Raoul Berger, Government by the Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 12 Val. U. L. Rev. 617 (1978).
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss3/6

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open
access by the Valparaiso University Law School at
ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized
administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information,
please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at
scholar@valpo.edu.

Nelson: Raoul Berger, Government by the Judiciary: The Transformation of

BOOK REVIEW
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT.
By Raoul Berger. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977. Pp. x,
483.
Once again, Raoul Berger has met his ambition of writing an
"important" book. However, this is the most generous statement
which can be made before beginning to criticize. Berger's previous
works which obtained national attention, primarily Impeachment'
and Executive Privilege,2 were important not so much for their content as for their timing, being released just as the Watergate scandals were developing. The importance of Government by Judiciary
likewise stems largely from the timing of its release, coming as it
did on the eve of the Bakke' decision.
Nowhere in the text of the book, however, does Berger mention the Bakke case, nor, for that matter, does he address the issue
of "affirmative action," "benign discrimination" or "reverse
discrimination" (the term chosen automatically relegating the selector to a well-defined ideological camp). This is surprising, for the entire thesis of the book-that Brown v. Board of Education' cannot
be justified under an historical analysis of the fourteenth amendment-is not aimed at correction of that 1954 judicial "error," but,
rather at prevention of future policy errors by the Court. Berger
argues forcefully that the Court exceeds its constitutional role when
it hands down decisions which are inconsistent with the intent of the
framers of that document. Of course, if Berger's historical technique
were applied to the issue of benign discrimination the result would
be a judgment in favor of Mr. Bakke, for it is clear beyond
peradventure that the framers of the fourteenth amendment did not
intend to elevate minorities to a legal position superior to that of
non-minorities.
R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973).
2. R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974).
3. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring state "separate but equal" school systems
unconstitutional).
1.
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Imputation to Berger of the motive to bolster Bakke's case is
not meant to trivialize the fundamental nature of the questions raised by Berger's approach to constitutional adjudication. Berger is
foremost a historian, which explains his basic postulate that the intent of the framers is to be the sole criterion in determining the content and scope of the various constitutional guarantees, particularly
the fourteenth amendment. Using his historical approach, the book
in great (indeed, even excessive) detail establishes the proposition
that neither the congressional draftsmen of the fourteenth amendment nor the ratifying states intended that black schoolchildren
should attend school with white schoolchildren. Thus established, it
follows under Berger's method that Brown v. Board was an instance
in which the Court clearly overstepped its bounds and unconstitutionally imposed its policy preferences upon the nation; according to
Berger, the results of Brown v. Board could have been achieved
legitimately only by resort to consitutional amendment through
either submission to the states or by consitutional convention.
The criticisms which can be directed at the book run from matters of style to basic arguments of doctrine. The book is not easy
reading even for a lawyer interested in American history. For example, nowhere in the book does Berger set out the text of the fourteenth amendment for the reader to consider independently, and
thus the reader is forced to resort to other sources in order fully to
comprehend the remarks addressed to various portions of the
amendment. In addition, Berger often refers to relatively obscure
nineteenth century personalities in making a point; as a consequence, the reader is often left to ponder the significance of a particular historical citation or source. Furthermore, the book progresses unevenly; the presentation of historical proofs is poorly
organized and difficult to follow. Indeed, the book seems to be a
compilation of a series of discrete essays. Notwithstanding these
criticisms, however, the volume does effectively draw attention to a
number of ideological shortcomings of the Warren court, e.g., that
the Court was singularly uninhibited by historical arguments and
traditional judicial limitations, and that it was the first Court to use
the Consitution consistently as an affirmative tool to achieve desired
positive social ends. Berger's ultimate thesis, that judicial innovation
can lead to judicial usurpation of political power, is effectively emphasized throughout.
The more interesting aspects of Berger's work arise when one
rejects his approach to constitutional adjudication -that
the
historical record is to be the sole determinant of the contents of conhttps://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss3/6
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stitutional guarantees-and asks instead the more fundamental
question, "By what theory or process is the Constitution to be given
meaning?" Although Berger does acknowledge that methods other
than historical research and analysis have been used to breathe life
into the Constitution, he nonetheless consistently attempts both to
contradict and to refute those other approaches. The most basic
criticism of the substance of the book is its refusal to admit the
possible validity of other approaches to constitutional adjudication.
Given Berger's stance, it is appropriate to survey some of those
other approaches.
One approach starts with Berger's rigorous historical examination, but then allows the Court a bit more leeway. It might be termed "historical projection." One using this approach first ascertains
the intended effect of a constitutional guarantee on conditions existing at the time of enactment or ratification, and then asks what (if
any) intent the framers had concerning how the guarantee should be
applied to future, necessarily changed, circumstances. Professor
Bickel seems to be the chief proponent of this type of approach,'
which will necessarily involve the historian in more speculation than
is involved under a strict application of the Berger approach. This
first alternative approach may, of course, be easily used to justify
Brown v. Board, for it is not difficult to ascribe an intent to the
framers that the amendment should be interpreted differently under
changed circumstances.
A second alternative allows the Court still greater latitude by
focusing not so much upon the historical basis of the guarantee but
rather upon a philosophical notion that the Constitution in a
democratic society is meant to protect the individual from the
government, ie., the will of the majority. Thus under this approach
the Constitution is perceived as essentially a counter-majoritarian
instrument. The primary modern advocate of this approach was
Chief Justice Stone, who in the famous note 4 in United States v.
Carolene Products Co.6 suggested that "discrete and insular
minorities" might deserve special judicial attention and solicitude.
Brown v. Board can easily be justified under this approach to constitutional decision making, since the opportunity to obtain an equal
education was judicially extended to the then-isolated minority consisting of black children.
5. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1, at 59 (1955).
6. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1978

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 [1978], Art. 6
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

620

[Vol. 12

A third, and still more liberal, attitude requires the Court
neither to be bound by the historical record (however construed) nor
to be concerned with individual rights in the face of tyranny by the
majority. Under this third regime, the Court would look to the present Congress in order to formulate the present content of the constitutional guarantee. Mr. Justice Brennan seems to be the primary
if not the only serious proponent of this approach. In Frontiero v.
Richardson,7 Brennan, writing for the plurality, suggested that sex
should be a suspect classification under the equal protection clause,
for, as Brennan stated, "[Olver the past decade, Congress [has] concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious,
and this conclusion of a coequal branch of government is not
without significance to the question presently under consideration,"
Brennan's approach is strikingly antithetical to Stone's; indeed,
Brennan seems to argue that legislation - majoritarian enactments- should be read into the Constitution. It is also interesting to
note that the Brennan approach, if applied to the facts antedating
Brown v. Board, would not have produced a decision in favor of
black schoolchildren, for Congress was then singularly unresponsive
to minorities' claims for equal treatment.
Various other approaches to constitutional interpretation remain, each allowing the Court greater flexibility than Berger's strict
historical approach. They range from "substantive due process" and
"shock the conscience" to what can only be described as judicial law
created by whimsy. Each of these latter approaches is certainly
much less analytically rigorous than those described above, allowing
the Court to do pretty much as it pleases. Decisions such as
Griswold v. Connecticut9 and Roe v. Wade1" can be placed in one, if
not more, of these latter categories.
This range of possible approaches to constitutional adjudication, in addition to being descriptive of the actual processes
employed by the Court, highlights what is perhaps a very significant
conclusion that one reading the book might draw, viz., that the Constitution has in fact been construed and manipulated by different
forces and interests at different times in the nation's history. Berger
argues that the legal historian, and only the legal historian, can cor7.
8.
9.

411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Id. at 687-88 (emphasis added).
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that an individual has a constitutional right to

privacy).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (imposing constitutional restrictions upon state prohibition and regulation of abortions).
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rectly interpret the Constitution. Generations of Supreme Court
justices have, of course, implicitly disregarded Berger's fundamental
truth. This reader, upon completing the volume, was left not so
much with a feeling of specific concurrence with the Berger approach but rather with a growing concern that the process of making constitutional decisions has become much less analytically
rigorous and principled in the recent past. The underlying message
of Government by Judiciary comes through strongly, and for this
reader, convincingly: As constitutional flexibility is achieved by the
Court, democratic values suffer. The book derives its true importance from the emphasis Berger places upon this verity.
Thomas H. Nelson*
*

Former Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law

School.
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